This paper proposes a dynamic model of motivating agents in creative settings. We model creativity as a demand for novelty, where there is little value to replicating the findings of others. Without agency concerns, agents attempt the most creative (important) problem, work harder on more creative problems, and are better paid for doing so. We show how sufficient agency concerns invert these. We show dynamics where creative successes are followed by periods of minor ambition. Furthermore, during these intervals, the most creative are least well paid, and we provide conditions where agents work hardest on the least creative problems. This pattern repeats over and over. We also show how fruitful creative fields can become fallow, either permanently or temporarily.
Our interest is in the interaction between creativity and agency concerns. To isolate this, we initially assume that the probability of success is independent of which point on the landscape is chosen. This implies that in the absence of agency issues, projects are carried out in order of their creativity -meaning that the agent locates at the point furthest from known landmarks. Furthermore, expected compensation is convex in creativity. We then address agency issues. They arise through a standard distortion, namely limited liability on the part of agents. (This agency distortion is for analytic simplicity.) When agency issues bind, the agent is paid not just on creative success but also on another signal of performance, which we call inputs. These are related to performance, but are not performance itself.
2 Furthermore, we assume that these inputs are more familiar when the problem being tackled is closer to existing successes. For example, techniques used to solve problems close to known results will likely be quite similar.
Consider the static problem. Our objective here is not simply to claim that agency concerns are necessarily heightened for activities far from known landmarks. Consider a case where, with the optimal compensation contract and the most creative available task, the agent is not sufficiently motivated to induce efficient effort. The key issue then becomes the interaction between effort and creative ambition. On the positive side, because surplus is generated by novelty, more creative projects have higher returns, and so naturally induce more effort. However, there is a countervailing incentive, in that if success is not achieved, the inputs used to solve the problem are less familiar when carrying out a project far from one's neighbors. This adversely affects the incentive to exert effort. When this latter effect dominates, creative ambition is restricted as agents work harder on less important problems.
These static agency concerns are used to address dynamics. The dynamics concern both whether the landscape is appropriately filled in over time, and the order in which this occurs.
First, we identify cycles of intervals where agents take successively less ambitious projects even though a more ambitious one remains available. We characterize the expected length of this interval. After the remaining opportunities become sufficiently small, the next agent attempts a breakthrough again. We show that during these intervals of local innovation, the most creatively ambitious agent receives the lowest expected compensation, and show circumstances where globally agents work hardest on the least important problems. These cycles rely on the need for novelty. In many experimentation settings in the literature, search stops when agents believe that they are close to the right answer. Here the payoff to remaining close to the innovations of others becomes so low that agents instead attempt something more ambitious.
To make this more concrete, think of a fashion designer considering her next line of clothing. Making a new line clothing like those that came before offers nothing to consumers.
Because radical innovations may fall on deaf ears, they innovate in less creative lines. However, at some point sufficiently local innovations begin to look so like existing fashion that they become "uncool". As a result, at some point in the interval, they switch from local innovation to attempt something more novel. However, once a designer succeeds in doing so, history repeats itself in the sense that it starts a new cohort of designers locally innovating around that point.
We also show how a field can become permanently "stuck", in the sense that if some agent succeeded at a project, it would open up profitable further opportunities for future agents, yet no agent is willing to attempt that first project. This cannot happen here without agency concerns. We then consider a number of extensions. First, we endogenize the demand for novelty by considering a consumer matching treatments to the height of the landscape, in a setting where firms hold property rights over previous discoveries. We also provide relevant comparative statics. First, creativity is encouraged by the intrinsic motivation of agents,
by relaxing agency problems. Second, much of the empirical evidence focuses on how truly novel work is often not quickly recognized. We show how limiting ambition is heightened in such settings. Finally, we provide an extension where a field lies fallow for some period of time, only to come back to life later. This arises because an agent may be reluctant to attempt a problem previously tried by another agent, for fear that that earlier attempt might later be recognized as a success. As such, this extension offers a different interpretation of a stop-start process of creative innovation.
Our work builds on previous contributions in the intersection of agency and experimentation. We discuss these links below. Conceptually closest is Callander, 2011, who also models innovation using a Brownian motion metric similar to ours Other contributions in this area include Jovanovic and Rob, 1989 , 1990 , Manso, 2011 , Horner and Samuelson, 2014 , Garfagnini and Stulovici, 2015 , Guo, 2016 , and Sadler, 2018 . We are also conscious of benchmarking our contribution to empirical evidence. We describe evidence on obstacles that novelty faces in gaining acceptance (Fiske and Taylor, 1991 , Monahan et al., 2000 , Eidelman et al., 2009 , Wang et al., 2017 , Calcagno et al, 2012 . However, the model offers a potentially non-monotonic relationship between creativity and its returns -very local innovations may be well done, but are of little interest, while very creative activities may be weakly executed.
We document empirical evidence in academia showing such a relationship, at least over the short run (Mukherjee et al., 2015 , Uzzi et al., 2013 , and discuss the evidence on how the effectiveness of incentive provision interacts with creativity (Balsmeier et al., 2017 , Erat and Gneezy, 2015 , Kachelmeier et al., 2008 .
Section 1 describes a model of creativity. We then consider the agent's incentives to exert effort and the reason to limit creativity in Section 2. Section 3 considers the dynamics of the model. We address some comparative statics in Section 4. We discuss evidence in Section 5.
Section 6 provides a series of extensions. Section 7 concludes.
A Model of Creativity
There is a landscape defined over a normalized support [0, 1] , and at discrete point i, the terrain has height h i . 3 The terrain is linked across locations, moving according to a Brownian Motion with no drift, dh i = σ h h i dW i , where W i is a Weiner process. As the discrete increments i become small (as we assume),
), where σ 2 h is the variance of the process. When the game begins in period t = 0, the height of the terrain is known at the two end points (h 0 and h 1 ), but is unknown in the interior.
4 Given this,
, where h i close to 0 or 1 is well known, but least is known for h1 2 .
Information on the landscape is provided by the effort of agents, hired by a competitive market of firms. In each period, a single agent can potentially be hired by a firm (we call the agent hired in period t "agent t") to map a single a single h j , j ∈ [0, 1]. As in Jovanovic and Rob, 1990, we assume that each agent lives for only one period, and that their order is exogenous.
5 Success in period t, which we denote Λ t , is discrete. If success has occurred, Λ t = 1, and h j is revealed; otherwise, Λ t = 0, and nothing about h j is revealed. 6 The landscape generates surplus to consumers in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, ....... In each period, there 3 Below we discuss the case where the terrain is unbounded. 4 This is for simplicity. We show below that the results are robust to relaxing the assumption of known end points. 5 This allows us to avoid inefficiencies in entry in research tournaments (Taylor, 1995, McAfee and Fullerton, 1999) , or complications that arise when points can be simultaneously discovered by more than one agent. 6 The reason for the stark distinction between success and failure is to allow clean determination of dynamics. In particular, if success is observed with noise, some projects will partially succeed. In that case, the next agent will have to make a decision between finishing off the job on the old location or striking out elsewhere. The discreteness here allows us to avoid this.
is a single consumer, consumer t. Let h it be the expected value of h i after any information has been collected in period t, where the Bayesian belief of the variance of h i in period t be given by σ 2 it . Surplus earned by the consumer in period t is given by the negative of the Bayesian estimate of the variance of h i
There is a competitive market of firms. In period t, one of these firms can employ agent t to identify a point on the landscape. Firms are infinitely lived, and discount at a rate δ.
As findings today are valuable not just for today's consumer, but also all future consumers, the surplus created by agent t's action is given by
The objective of the competitive market of firms is to maximize (2) subject to zero expected profits.
To understand the relationship of (1) and the firm's objective in (2), consider a medical setting that we elaborate on below. First consider consumers. Let consumers have illnesses uniformly distributed over [0, 1] , and are indexed by i. Cures to illnesses 0 and 1 are known, but not in the interior. Illnesses are linked by a Brownian motion as above. A cure depends on matching a treatment to h i , and losses from deviating from the optimal cure are quadratic.,
The expected welfare of the consumer is shown below to be given by (1). 7 Second, we show below that when firm's hold property rights over their successes, their objective is to maximize their marginal contribution ∆V t .
The central building block of this work is that there is little return to duplicating what others have already done. To see the link to (2), any point that is already identified has σ 2 it = 0. As a result, there is no value to identifying that point again. Instead, it will turn out that the highest return derives from the point furthest from previous discoveries. This is the sense in which there is a demand for novelty. For some point i, let r t be the distance between the nearest two known neighbors in period t. We call larger r t more "creative ambition". We show in the Appendix that surplus is maximized by mapping the midpoint of the partition -the point furthest from a known landmark -with surplus from success of
7 Another plausible application is areas of culture where replication has little value, either because it is easy to do causing rents to fall, or because consumers seek to be different from what came before. Examples of the latter would be fashion or contemporary art.
We assume that firms can contract on S, or equivalently r.
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Information: The agent incurs unobserved effort at cost e t . Let π(e t ) ≥ 0 be the probability of success, where π > 0, π < 0, and π(∞) < 1. In order to isolate agency issues, this is assumed to be independent of location. The agent is assumed to maximize wages minus effort costs and has a reservation utility U . Let w t be the wage paid to agent t.
There are two contractible signals on the agent's effort. First, Λ t is observed. Second, there is a signal on what we call inputs, reflecting pieces of a puzzle that may lead to success.
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For now, we treat the inputs as simply additional information on e but below we formalize the link between inputs and success. We denote outcomes on the inputs by I t ∈ {0, 1}, where we assume that the probability of I t = 1 is given by Γ(e t , r t ). This is revealed at the same time as Λ t . We assume that Γ e > 0, and Γ ee ≤ 0. We discuss the relation to r below. We assume for simplicity that, conditional on effort, π and Γ are independent.
The timing of the model is as follows. Entering period t = 1, 2, 3, ...., all firms observe
, and agent t and consumer t are born. Firms then simultaneously offer a contract (w t , r t ) to agent t to maximize ∆V t , subject to zero expected profits. The wage can be conditioned on Λ t and I t . The agent accepts at most one contract and exerts effort e t , which results in a realization of success Λ t and input performance I t . Then the agent is paid w t , σ 2 it is computed, the agent and consumer die, and the next period begins.
Benchmark without Agency Concerns As a benchmark, consider the outcome where effort is contractible. By competition, the agent will earn an expected wage of E∆V t .
10 If the participation constraint is slack, the choice of effort maximizes π(e t )S(r t ) − e t , and its optimal choice e * * t (r t ) is given by π (e * * t )S(r t ) = 1.
As returns are increasing in r in (3) and π is independent of r, the agent should work on the largest remaining partition, which has size r * * t . She exerts effort e * * t (r * * t ), and is paid w t = π(e * * t (r * * ))S(r * * t ). Furthermore, effort is increasing in (a) ambition (r * * t ), (b) lack of knowledge of the landscape (σ 2 h ), and (c) patience. If π(e * * t (r * * t ))S(r * * t ) − e * * t ≥ U , a contract with these features is accepted, and otherwise discovery ends.
This outcome has the intuitive feature that the most ambitious project is tackled first: the field evolves with a project of size , and so on. Note also that the probability of success declines over time, as agents work hardest on the more creative projects done first. Finally, expected compensation of agents declines in a convex manner over time, as larger partitions disappear. This process occurs until the largest remaining partition does not offer the agent at least expected utility of U , at which point exploration stops.
The Agency Problem
The paper is concerned with how creativity is affected by agency problems. Here we use a simple tractable source of such agency costs, namely limited liability for agents. Specifically, let w t be the wage paid to the agent:
The second part of this is simply that limited liability arises at a point no higher than their market wage, and is used simply to ensure that the benchmark without agency concerns is unchanged. Agent compensation is potentially based both on success and performance on the inputs, w t (Λ t , I t ). Consider the choice of contract (w t , r t ), where the set of available partition elements inherited from the last period are of size r t . Competition between firms implies that the period t contract maximizes the utility of agent t. This involves maximizing expected surplus each period.
11 LetÛ (e * (r t , w t ), r t ) be the agent's expected utility, wherê
and e * (r t , w t ) is equilibrium effort for a project of size r t and contract w t . The firm chooses r t and w t to maximize (5), subject to e * (r t , w t ),Û (e * , r t ) ≥ U , and r t ∈ r t .
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To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, begin by considering e * with the optimal contract w * t (Λ t , I t ). As the agent is risk neutral above w, the optimal incentive contract pays the agent only in the state that is most informative of effort, namely when both Λ t = 1 and Γ t = 1. Hence, w * t (1, 1) = w ΛI ; otherwise w * t (Λ, I) = w 0 ≥ w. Conditional on r t , it is independent of t. (From now on, we ignore time subscripts unless necessary.)
The agent then chooses effort to maximize π(e)Γ(e, r)w ΛI + (1 − π(e)Γ(e, r))w 0 − e. For notational convenience, let
Γe(e,r) Γ(e,r) ≡ g(e, r). Effort e * is then given by
The choice of w ΛI and w 0 is constrained by budget balance 13 ,
As a result, the simplified program chooses r, w ΛI , and w 0 to maximize (5), subject to (6),
,Û (e * , r) ≥ U , and r ∈ r.
To see the limits of compensation contracting, consider the wage contract that offers the greatest incentives. This involves w 0 = w and w ΛI set at the maximum payment consistent with budget balance. This is given by w * ΛI = S(r) Γ(e * ,r)
−
(1−π(e * )Γ(e * ,r))w π(e * )Γ(e * ,r)
. Then the maximum feasible effort for a project r is given by (π (e * ) + π(e * )g(e * , r)) Γ(e * , r) (w *
11 This can be seen by backward induction. Let r be the final sized partition attempted by agents -beyond that the agent's expected utility is below U . For that partition, the objective of the agent is to maximize its myopic return π(e)S(r) − e(r), as there is no future return. But if the final agent does this, any agent attempting the next to last sized partition will do likewise. Unraveling then implies that so also do all earlier agents. Said another way, a firm could conceivably want to choose a low expected return project today because it could increase payoffs in the future. However, there is no way to compensate today's agent for doing so. As a result, competition implies that the firm needs to make non-negative profits in each period. 12 There is a firm solvency constraint that we are ignoring here. Specifically if π is sufficiently low, the firm may not break even if it has to pay all failed workers w. This issue is far from our interests here, and is ignored. 13 This is based on a belief of effort e * , which will be correct in equilibrium where the second order condition is assumed to hold.
14 At that contract offering maximal incentives, consider the impact of changing r. It is useful to begin by addressing how a marginal increase in r affects the agent's utility. (The firm does not make such local choices -instead it chooses between the midpoints of a discrete set of available partitions -but the logic is useful.) Note that
whereÛ e = 1 − (π + πg) S(r) − w π reflects the agency problem, with higher effort valued at its marginal returnÛ e .
Only if contracting cannot solve the agency problem willÛ e be positive. To understand U e , it is useful to rewrite (8) as
The first bracketed term identifies maximum possible effort with a contract was based only on success (w t (1, 1) = w t (1, 0)), where limited liability always causes effort to fall below its desired level. 15 The second term allows additional information on inputs to mitigate (and potentially overturn) the agency problem. 16 Our interest is in cases where agency issues cannot be resolved by compensation alone. This arises when the agency problem (here parameterized by w) is sufficiently important, as given by Assumption 2.
17
Assumption 2:Û e (e * (w *
. Assumption 2 implies that because effort is suboptimal, w ΛI will be set at its maximum level. To simplify notation, we do not condition e * on this wage below.
The motivation for the paper is that creativity is hard to interpret and reward. We model this by assuming that the inputs used for local problems are more easily "interpretable" than for less known problems, via Assumption 3.
14 This is given by π + π (e * )g(e * , r) + π(e * )
ΓeeΓ−Γ 2 e Γ 2 S(r) − w π(e * ) < 0. 15 Without further signals, efficiency (π (e * )S(r) = 1) can only be attained if w = 0. 16 If there was no cost to using pay for performance, the firm could trivially replicate the efficient outcome above by setting incentives in any combination such that w Λ + w I Γ (e * * ,r * * ) π (e * * ) = S(r * * ). 17 To show how limited creativity arises as a potential solution to agency concerns, we only need to make Assumption 2 evaluated at the efficient project choice. We make this more extended assumption solely so we can restrict attention to contracts which have the maximum bonus payments.
Assumption 3: g r < 0.
Efficiency in agency settings is often determined by likelihood ratios, identifying the informativeness of signals. In that vein, g is the marginal return of effort, normalized by its average level. This assumption implies that it falls as agents attempt more creative projects.
18

Single Period Creativity
The agent prefers a marginally less ambitious project if (9) is negative. As S (r) > 0 and U e > 0 from Assumption 2, this requires that
where H is an amended version of the second order condition above, and assumed to be positive.
19 First note that it need not be that agency concerns are heightened as r increases.
The first term in the numerator of (11) is positive, because the surplus generated by more effort is increasing in creative ambition. Yet, from Assumption 3, the second term is negative.
Substituting (11) into (9) yields
dÛ (e, r) dr
This provides the foundation for understanding the influences that arise below. First -and most obviously -the value of success is increasing in r. Second, there is a complementarity between the agent's effort and the size of the prize (
. Both of these influences lead to taking a bite at the most ambitious (or creative) remaining partition. However, as g r < 0, a more ambitious project may induce less effort as inputs are less informative. Because of this last effect, the effect of a more ambitious project on the agent's welfare is ambiguous.
This illustrates the tradeoff.
It should be immediately clear that when
dÛ (e,r) dr > 0, the agent carries out projects in the efficient way, by always choosing the largest project. There is an additional benefit
. One natural interpretation of this is that creativity per se does not affect average performance (Γ r = 0) but that as performance measures become noisier (Γ er < 0). We offer two examples of this in Section 6. 19 The term H = −(π + π g + πg e ) S(r) − w π(e * ) + π (π + g) w π 2 > 0 is amended from above because r is chosen before effort, and as a result, the optimal contract adapts.
to creativity when de * dr > 0, as it also relaxes the agency problem. However, when de * dr is sufficiently negative, the firm chooses to restrict creativity as a way of inducing effort.
The agent does not make marginal partition choices as above. Instead, discrete options are available, but the logic is identical. Remember that partitions are optimally split in half.
This implies that the agent potentially chooses between the largest remaining partition, of size 1 2 k , and others of size 1 2 k+s , where k ≥ 2 and s ⊂ {1, 2, 3...}. Surplus from succeeding at the larger partition
As a result, the agent then prefers the partition
More generally, the agent carries out this comparison for all available 1 2 k+s sized partitions and only prefers the largest one if (13) holds for all available s.
Dynamics of Creativity
Up to now, we have considered the static incentives of a single agent. How does the discovery process evolve over time? The simplicity of (13) 
In words, κ(k) is the next smallest partition element where the largest one k is preferred.
As a benchmark for what follows, Proposition 1 immediately follows.
Proposition 1 If κ = k +1 for all k ≤ k, then the agent always attempts the most ambitious project until project k, at which point there is no further searching.
Getting Stuck Before describing cases where projects are taken in a different order to the efficient benchmark, consider one other distortion. If effort is contractible, projects are done in order of their surplus, and if one agent chooses not to carry out the best remaining project, there is no smaller project worth exploring. This is not necessarily true here. This
This can happen only if effort is higher for the less ambitious project. In words, if someone succeeded at a project of size 1 2 k , this would open up smaller projects that future agents would attempt, but no one is willing to attempt the size k project. In this sense, a field can "get stuck" permanently.
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Of more novelty are the dynamics among attempted projects. Consider the case where κ = k + 1 for some k, but where the field is not stuck, as U (k) ≥ U . Here the agent prefers to take a less ambitious project than the biggest one available, but will attempt the larger one if no project between k + 1 and κ − 1 is available. Proposition 2 formalizes the length of intervals where limited ambition arises, the sense of history repeating itself, and the returns to creativity.
Proposition 2 Consider the first agent who is faced with a largest partition of size 1 2 k and at least one smaller option. Then if κ = k + 1, there is an interval where agents do not attempt the most ambitious project. During this interval,
• The number of successful agents who pass on projects of size
• The expected number of agents who attempt a project smaller than
• During the interval, the agents who attempt the most creative project are least well paid in expected terms.
• After the interval ends, agents again attempt a project of size 1 2 k . When success occurs, the interval above occurs again. This process of success followed by limited ambition arises a further 2 k−1 times in total.
After this exercise completes all projects of size 1 2 κ−1 , the agent chooses whether to explore a project of size 1 2 κ , and the model continues. 21 The fact that there is a smaller project than 1 2 k that has welfare above U does not of course mean it is welfare improving for the larger project to be done. This requires a comparison of the welfare loss from the intervening projects, and in addition any later projects that might be done as a result.
Proposition 2 offers the central outcomes of the paper. It has two features. First, in our market for novelty, agents should reach for the most creative options, and be well paid for doing so. When the agency concerns above are sufficiently important, this does not arise.
Instead, we find agent trying to solve local problems. Yet this is not because -as would be standard -because they are near the right answer but rather because radical experimentation is not likely to be recognized. This has the implication that those are more creatively ambitious during those intervals are least well paid. This is the inverse of the efficient outcome. Yet the dynamics have an upside. Specifically, at some point local innovations lack enough novelty that agents switch back to attempting something more ambitions. As one example, this could be a fashion designer whose clothes become so like existing fashion that it becomes sufficiently "uncool" that the designer has to attempt something more ambitious.
The logic for the length of the interval duration above is straightforward. Specifically, if an agent prefers projects up to size . Furthermore, one of those smaller partition elements is always available, so all will be completed before one of size 1 2 κ is attempted.
22 Note that we do not know the order in which these 2 κ−k − 2 projects are attempted, as there could be further cycles of even more limited ambition within that interval.
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This describes the dynamics that arise only until the next project of size 1 2 k is attempted. After success has occurred at the second project of size 1 2 k , the exact same cycle outlined above occurs again, with identical expected outcome. There are 2 k−1 partitions in total of size 1 2 k , so the interval above occurs that number of times before all projects of size 1 2 κ−1 are completed. In this sense, the outcome of the model is history repeating itself 2 k−1 − 1 times.
Finally, consider pay. If effort could be contracted upon, the most creative agent is paid best: indeed, expected pay is weakly convex in creativity. During the intervals outlined above, the opposite is true. Here the lowest utility is attained by the agent taking the
As an example, consider the agent who moves after the first two successes at points . But as κ = 6, the smaller partition is chosen, and so on. There are 2 4 − 2 = 14 such partitions. 23 As an example, assume that the agent faces a largest project of size project, the largest available one. Furthermore, as her effort is lowest for that project, this implies that expected compensation is lowest for the agent who takes the most creatively ambitious project.
Effort, Creativity, and Wages The dynamics above point to the possibility of agents preferring less ambitious projects for some ranges of ambition. However, can it be the case that agents globally exert most effort on the least important attempted problems? Relatedly, can the most creative agents be globally least well paid, as their effort is commensurately lower?
To address this, consider an example where k = 2 so that only projects of size . Then if
the agent works hardest on the least creative taken project.
This example also allows the possibility that those who take on the most creative projects are globally least well paid. This arises if expected compensation π(e * ( 1 2
).
Known End Points
We have assumed that there are end points with known height when the game begins. One alternative assumption is where the terrain is a circle where no points are known. The first agent would then choose any point in the circle to identify so that h 0 and h 1 are the same point and 1 is the perimeter of the circle. This offers identical outcomes to above.
A more novel extension is where there is no known end point, and that, in at least one direction, there is a terrain that stretches out infinitely. Consider the case where the terrain is infinite in one direction, from 0 to ∞. This is the setting studied by Garfagnini and Strulovici, 2015 . Let R < ∞ be the agent's preferred choice of partition when faced with an infinitely sized terrain. Then the first agent chooses point R. This determines a partition from 0 to R, and the results of the previous section hold, but with one additional option for the next agent: to choose r = R again, by locating at point 2R. If the agent does this, there is a stationary outcome where every agent chooses R ad infinitum. This is reminiscent of the outcome in Jovanovic and Rob, 1990 , where the returns to innovation are sufficiently high.
Of more interest is the case when R is not the preferred choice of the first agent choosing after the first R partition is solved. Instead, she prefers to R, and so on. In that case, the cycles of limited ambition continue an infinite number of times. where there is an interval of agents taking less ambitious projects than R, but when they get sufficiently small, another r = R is chosen and the next cycle begins.
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Temporal Issues So far, we have said little about the speed at which the landscape is filled.
25 If effort could be contracted upon, the expected time between success is decreasing in r. By contrast, when the agency issues here imply limited creative ambition, the opposite occurs: slow breakthroughs on important problems are followed by more rapid successes on smaller problems. The expected number of periods until success is achieved for a project of size r is 1 π(e * (r))
. In the example above, if more effort is exerted only on less ambitious problems, then projects of size . When success on this is finally achieved, it is followed by more rapid local successes at a rate
for the two smaller projects. In this way, the model predicts the possibility of long periods between breakthroughs, followed by a more rapid series of local successes.
The Demand for Novelty
We have assumed up to now that there is a demand for novelty. Here we endogenize consumer surplus and the objective of the firm in the context of a demand for medical services.
Consumer t has need for a medical service. His medical condition is uncertain, and is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. For a given location i, he chooses an action (or his doctor prescribes an action) H it , which optimally depends on the h i . His condition is revealed at the end of period t. Specifically, his expected payoff depends on matching the action to the state of nature and is given by a quadratic loss function
In this example, the cure H it to a uniformly distributed disease with characteristics h i has 24 The final case is where the terrain is infinite in both directions. Then the first agent randomly chooses a point, and after that the results for the case above hold, except that agents who choose the R can choose either left or right. 25 Note that Proposition 2 addresses the number of successes, not the number of agents attempting suboptimal projects. The probability of a success for a project of size 1 2 k+i is given by π(e * ( 1 2 k+i )). As the probability of success is independent across partitions and time, and there are 2 j−1 partitions in total of size 1 2 j , the expected number of agents exhibiting limited ambition is
. the feature that some diseases are close to existing knowledge and others less close.
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The consumer can purchase information on the distribution of h from a firm. Unless he purchases information, consumer t is uninformed about h i beyond the prior distribution.
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Consider consumer t's willingness to pay for the period t distribution (including any findings in period t) over the prior. Consumer t chooses H * it to maximize − 1 0
2 di, and sets
it . The consumer's expected utility with h it = H * it is then given by the Brownian bridge
This derives the preferences of the consumer, as in (1). The consumer's expected utility without information beyond the prior is
. Consumer t is then willing to pay up to
to receive information on h it . Firm t makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the consumer, and charges
The final ingredient is how the price p * t is distributed across firms. The price paid depends on the successes of all prior firms. We assume that firms have property rights over their findings, so that of the price p t paid by consumer t, the firm that employed an agent in a previous period j receives V j − V j−1 from this. As this is equivalent to p * t = t j=1 (V j − V j−1 ), firms are therefore only rewarded for incremental discoveries.
29 If no success is achieved, then
The price paid by the consumer is then
. As this price is also received from all future consumers, the expected return to the firm upon a period t success is Vt−V t−1 1−δ (before wage costs) or S(r t ) = as required. As a result, a combination of a quadratic loss function and property rights generates the demand for novelty above.
26 There are also mappings to cultural innovation, where an art collector may be more informed about what constitutes good painting (or a particular kind of painting), but has less information on something like performance art, and his returns to information may be higher as a result.
27 Note that the model does not imply that the consumer observes payoffs in each state -instead, the loss function is an expected payoff. For example, it could imply a setting where randomly some state i is realized, or one where only coarse realizations of outcomes arise. In the hospital setting, a patient could get a particular illness or not, and the outcome could be coarse (patient survives/does not survive). 28 In some creative settings, firms can sell goods to consumers to capture these rents; for example, galleries selling art, studios selling movies, businesses capturing monetary returns to innovation, and so on. In others, it is the status associated with being associated with success, such as museums hosting breakthrough shows, or universities whose employees win major awards. 29 An alternative assumption with an identical outcome would be to allow consumer t to observe h i(t−1)
but require them to pay previous innovators for using it. Note that this price apportionment satisfies budget balance. Also note that given this apportionment of rents, no other firms benefit from making an offer to the consumer.
Agency Comparative Statics
The dynamics above rely on agency issues being sufficiently severe. Yet we have not fully explored when this is likely to occur. Here we provide comparative statics on the single period problem. Note that there are two signals on performance. As a result, we carry out two conceptual exercises: (i) when the severity of the agency problem changes for both signals, and (ii) when the ability to interpret one of the two signals changes. We deal with each in turn.
Intrinsic Motivation and Creativity
There is a large literature on how intrinsic motivation tends to lead to more creativity. Classic references here are Deci and Ryan, 1985 , and Amabile, 1997 . See Hennessy, 2001 , for a review. 30 The usual conduit in that literature is how intrinsic motivation implies a curiosity that leads to more creative solutions. This model offers an alternative link, where intrinsic motivation leads to creativity by relaxing agency concerns.
Consider a setting where intrinsic motivation is modeled as an agent being capable of exerting some effort at no cost. (The cost could be negative over some range with no change in results.) As effort is modeled in cost units, this is represented by a probability π(0) = ν that can be produced at no cost, where higher ν reflects more intrinsic motivation. Otherwise the model is unchanged, where we continue to assume that Assumption 2 holds. The analog to (9) is now dÛ (e * , r) dr = (π(e * ) + ν)S (r) +Û e de * dr .
To see the role of intrinsic motivation, note that d 2Û (e * ,r) drdν = S (r) > 0, so that more intrinsically motivated workers benefit more from greater creativity. In simple terms, an intrinsically motivated agent is less likely to limit creativity, as she has to give up more. Proposition 3 immediately follows.
Proposition 3 Creative ambition is weakly increasing in intrinsic motivation, ν.
Note that this outcome was not hard-wired as the willingness to exert effort intrinsically did not depend on creativity per se.
30 Much of this empirical evidence uses ex post self-reports of task interest to measure intrinsic motivation and correlates these responses with various measures of performance. However, there is some work that seeks external measures of intrinsic motivation. For example, Reeve and Nix, 1997, measures intrinsic motivation through the facial expressions of experimental subjects, and notes correlation to performance.
When Success is Hard to Identify Much of the motivation for the agency problem above is that agents are less likely to be recognized for novel contributions. Yet the model above only considers limited liability as an agency constraint. There are two variants of recognition for creativity. First, it may never be recognized (π r < 0). We deal with this below. Second, it could be that while success can generate payoffs to the firm, the agent does not get those returns. This could be because success comes too late for the agent to benefit. To address this, assume that the agent is rewarded for success with probability z, while performance on inputs is always observed. With this addition, the agent's incentives with the contract above are now given by z (π (e * ) + π(e * )g(e * , r)) (w ΛI − w) = 1.
This extension, in itself, does not change outcomes because the optimal bonus can simply be scaled up proportionately to maintain incentives: instead of offering a marginal reward of
, the optimal contract offers
, and nothing changes. This is, of course, the Becker logic, and implies limited observability makes no difference to outcomes. This neutrality result is no longer true if there are limits to how much bonuses can be raised. For example, there could be fairness constraints across workers, limited liability by the firm, or it could be that the firm might be tempted to renege on promised payments if rewards for success are too great. To model this, we assume that there is now an exogenous maximum bonus above w that can be given to an agent, which we denote b max .
In this case, the informativeness of the signals potentially becomes critical for the maximum feasible effort. Specifically, the optimal contract changes, in that it may no longer be efficient to pay a bonus only when both signals are successful. Specifically, if the bonus constraint is sufficiently binding, 31 we show in the Appendix that the optimal contract is instead to offer b max if either signal is positive. Incentives are then given by (zπ +(1−zπ)Γ e )b max = 1, and so
if the second order condition holds. As a result, incentives are always encouraged by reducing creativity unlike the ambiguous outcome above.
The purpose of this section is to show how limited observability of success leads to limited ambition. Yet this outcome only arises if wage payments are constrained by b max .
From (18), that is more likely as z falls. Hence the inability to observe success makes the value of restricting creative ambition to induce effort more desirable. 
Related Literature
First consider the existing empirical evidence beyond that on intrinsic motivation above.
The first issue is resistance to novelty, on which there is a large literature in psychology using experimental data. For example, Fiske and Taylor, 1991 initially rejected papers were higher than those that were accepted at their first journal.
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Of course, the modeling results above do not imply that agents should avoid novelty.
Instead, there is a tradeoff between creativity and how well it is likely to be executed:
projects close to known landmarks may be well done, but of little intrinsic value, while those of πS (r * * ) from (12). Specifically, then let w Γ∪I be the wage paid if either signal is a success, and w 0 be the wage if both fail. Then from the firm's budget constraint, w 0 = πS(r) − (z + (1 − z)π)b max , and w Γ∪I = w 0 + b max , and so expected pay still depends on r. 33 In their experiment, they show subjects a series of images. For some subjects, images are repeated while for others, the images are all different. They showed that images that were all different induced negative affect in their subjects (it put them in a bad mood) as it increased uncertainty. Mueller et al, 2011, extend this line of work by showing that much of this bias is unconscious: people perceive themselves as open to new ideas to a greater extent than is actually true.
34 In the first two years after publication, highly novel papers are 30% less likely to be in the top 1% of cited papers, whereas fourteen years after, they are 40% more likely. far from known landmarks may not be so well done. This offers the possibility of a "sweet spot" in the middle. Evidence accords with this. First, Mukherjee et al., 2015, and Uzzi et al., 2013 , map citations of scientific publications using metrics for novelty, and show that academic impact is maximized by combining some novelty with already known components.
Those who eschew the known for more innovative ingredients at that margin, or who do not have enough novelty, tend to suffer. 37 As a direct example of a non-monotonicity between familiarity and returns, Boudreau et al, 2016 , study referee evaluations of endocrinology grant proposals. (The referees are randomly assigned.) They find an inverted U-curve in how ratings relate to the intellectual distance between the evaluator and that embodied in the proposal. Those close to the rater's knowledge, and those far away were rated poorly compared to those of intermediate distance.
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The second part of the argument is that incentives are more successful when agents have a less creative focus. There is a small experimental literature in economics on the impact of offering incentives in creative settings, where the creativity of the setting varies. 39 These studies offer subjects the opportunity to take a more or less creative option, and provide some subjects with financial incentives based on a measure of success. The results of the experiments suggest that pay for performance only works when agents do less creative tasks (Charness and Grieco, 2014, Erat and Gneezy, 2016) . The closest experimental test is Kachelmeier et al., 2008 , where subjects are offered monetary rewards for completing rebus puzzles. Incentives are offered both for more puzzles and for more creative solutions to those puzzles. They note that the highest weighted productivity arose when subjects were offered incentives to produce quantity over more creative options. This reflects the tradeoff here where narrowing assignments in a less ambitious way ultimately improves performance.
40
37 Their preferred interpretation is that known ingredients are necessary in order to implement the research.
Henderson and Clark, 1990, make a similar point. 38 Note also from the Siler et al., 2015, data in Figure 1 that reviewers were successful in rejecting many papers that subsequently has very few cites: these may have been those that offered little advance over existing knowledge. 39 Our interest here is in studies where incentives are offered, but where creativity varies. There is a large and inconclusive literature on whether incentives in creative settings work (Mehta et al, 2017, Erat and Gneezy, 2015) We also do not address the literature on using tournaments or competitions to induce creativity. See Bradler et al, 2016 , as a recent example. 40 A useful caveat here is the limited time frame over which effects are measured. Many creative activities percolate over months or years, and it is not clear whether the immediate influences of the experimental studies arise over these longer time frames. Related to this, note that a study by Kachelmeier et al., 2015, found that resampling agents a week after an initial intervention reversed their results: those agents who were placed on incentives performed worse during the experiment, but were more creative a week later.
For a real world setting outside academia, Balsmeier et al, 2016 , study the impact of independent corporate boards on innovation. It is well known that independent boards often implement practices that reduce agency problems, among them measures to make executives more financially accountable for their performance. They study the impact of board independence on the number and kind of patents that are filed by companies. Two results arise. First, the number of patents rises. Second, it does so only in "more crowded and familiar areas of technology" (p.536). This possibility of better, but less ambitious, outcomes generated by incentive provision is the central message of the paper.
Creativity is often discussed in the arts. (that is to say, the art world)".
Related Theoretical Literature As mentioned in the introduction, this paper relates to previous work on experimentation, where firms compare the merits of an existing status quo known option and a risker alternative. Formally closest is Callander, 2011, who uses a similar Brownian motion set-up to address, in his case, project choice. Unlike our setting, the tension in that work is between the appeal of free riding off previous contributions and innovating. In that setting, uncertainty is unappealing to firms, as it adds risk, and leads to less innovation. By contrast, here uncertainty is what gives merit to innovation, as it leads to the demand for novelty. As in this work, there is the prospect of local innovation over more radical outcomes, and the possibility of a field getting stuck. The leading case there is that this is caused by the agent believing that he is close to the right answer, and so finds greater innovation to be not needed. Here these outcomes can arise even in settings where it is clear that the agent is far from her preferred point, and is generated by agency costs for such leaps. Also related is Gargfagnini and Strulovici, 2015, where agents choose between local and more radical innovation. Once again, the cost of radical change is exogenously higher, and this cost is traded off against the option value of discovering better than current
practice.
An older literature on radical and incremental innovations in research and development settings is also relevant. In Jovanovic and Rob, 1989 , firms choose between implementing an existing project or further developing it. Other firms can potentially mimic, in an efficient way. However, by assumption, ideas can only be mimicked if they are being further developed. Because firms cannot charge other firms for this, they implement their ideas too soon, and research moves more incrementally than is efficient. Jovanovic and Rob, 1990, address the distinction between radical and incremental change in a more parametric way. They do not offer a model endogenizing the costs and benefits of incremental and radical change, but instead characterize period of cycles between the two when the benefits of radical change and the costs lie in an intermediate range.
Finally, other work addresses agency concerns in experimentation settings. Two notable works that address contracting issues are Manso, 2011, and Horner and Samuelson, 2014. In each paper, the role of failure in optimal contracting is key, though in different ways.
Manso argues for the importance of forgiving failure in trying to encourage the kind of risky endeavors that creativity involves. By contrast, Horner and Samuelson focus on the temptation for workers to consciously fail at projects, in to render future contracts more desirable. Guo, 2016 , addresses how success in experimentation settings affect delegation of control, while Sadler, 2018, addresses how agents may seek to focus on "dead ends" rather than more creative possibilities. Though important, these issues are not the concerns of this work given the simplicity of our contracting space.
Extensions
Here we consider the role of a variety of assumptions used above.
When Creative Projects are Less Likely to Succeed
The model above assumes that the probability of success is independent of creative ambition. This allows us to cleanly distinguish between the efficient benchmark of maximal creativity and the more limited creativity outlined above. In many settings, more creative projects are harder to pull off.
Here we consider the robustness of the results to this extension.
Let the probability of success be now given by π(e, r), where π e (e, r) > 0 and π r (e, r) < 0.
With this extension,
dÛ (e * ,r) dr = π(e * )S (r)+π r S(r)+Û e de * dr , and
Let r * * * be efficient creativity in the absence of the agency problem. 41 Then a redefined ana-log to Assumption 2 is that effort is below its efficient level at r * * * . This extension then has similar qualitative features to above as dÛ (e * ,r) dr has the same influences as above: all it does is evaluate it at a partition potentially different from the largest one. Once again, restricting creativity may be efficient.
The dynamics in Proposition 2 also continue to hold, but with one necessary condition.
Define κ(k) as above, where κ is the largest project 1 2 κ smaller than 1 2 k that is dominated by 1 2 k . For Proposition 2 to carry over, we additionally need that the most efficient project in the absence of agency concerns in that range remains the largest one, 1 2 k . If this is so, then Proposition 2 continues to hold, with intervals of limited creativity. Furthermore, it remains the case that fields can get permanently stuck for the reason outlined above. As such, the qualitative results above do not depend on success being technologically independent of creativity.
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Non-contractible project choices So far, we have assumed that the firm can direct the project choice of the agent, through say how it funds scientific proposals. In many creative settings, this could be difficult. As an alternative, consider the case where r cannot be contracted upon, but instead is chosen by the agent. What matters then is what can be contracted upon. If S can be contracted upon, then there is a simple forcing contract where the agent is only paid w * ΛI if and only if success yields a specific payoff, namely the payoff from the project of optimal creativity. At the opposite extreme, consider the benchmark where all that can be contracted upon is "success", Λ ∈ {0, 1}, where a wage w ΛI is paid if any success is achieved.
The agent now chooses r to maximize π(e)S(r) − e, wherer is now a belief held by the firm about the choice of r made by the agent. The agent's choice of r is given by
π e (e * * , r * * * )S(r * * * ) = 1. 42 This extension allows the possibility of one novel outcome: where the optimal contract can involve more creativity than the myopic first best. Adding the agency problem above implies that we need to evaluate surplus at e * , where π e (e * , r * * * ) +
Γe(e * ,r * * * ) Γ(e * ,r * * * ) S(r * * ) − w π(e * ) = 1. Then dÛ (e * ,r * * * ) dr =Û e de where w ΛI (r) is the optimal bonus based on a beliefr. Here the likelihood of attaining the bonus is affected by r via Γ r instead of S(r). We have not signed this above. However, the leading cases alluded to above are ones where Γ r = 0. If this is the case, and w ΛI > w 0 , then
and the agent chooses the least creative option possible. In equilibrium, the wage is then based on surplus for that smallest partition. Yet remember that this is the outcome conditional on w ΛI (r) > w, and so incentives are provided. There is one alternative: to simply offer no incentives, and pay independent of success. This involves zero effort but at least generates no reason to restrict creativity, with payoff π(0)S(r * * ).
This is a stark outcome -either give no incentives, or take the least creative optioncaused by a stark assumption, namely, that the contract cannot distinguish between success on minimally important projects and success on the efficient project. The model can naturally be extended to a setting where the true payoff is probabilistically identified, and the willingness of the agent to choose an ambitious project is increasing in the probability of the true payoff being realized. However, once again this section involves the agent potentially being less creative than optimal, not for the reason that it induces more effort, but as a distortionary response to the fact that ex post success cannot be contracted upon. We have ignored non-contractibility of creative ambition to avoid this additional distortion that is not the focus of the paper.
Fallow Periods The likelihood of a contribution being recognized quickly often depends on its novelty. To address this, consider a case where there are no inputs (so Γ = 0), but where if the agent is successful, she only receives the incremental reward of [S(r)− w π(e * ) ], with probability z(r), where z (r) < 0. While the agent is rewarded for success with probability z(r), we assume that the payoff to the principal is λz(r)S(r), where λ > 1. The interpretation of λ > 1 is that agents are more short lived than are firms, and success is only recognized later.
We formalize this below. When choosing effort, the agent does so to maximize π(e)z(r)[S(r)− , and
where
< 0 if the the second order condition holds. Once again, this cannot a priori be signed, but not because of the distinction between inputs and success.
Instead, because agents are concerned that taking ambitious projects will not be recognized, z < 0. Once again, limited ambition may be used to encourage effort.
The purpose of the interpretation above is not simply to show that other assumptions are consistent with a role for limited creative ambition. Instead, it allows the possibility of fields becoming fallow, where agents choose not to search for some period of time, but after some time has elapsed, they will begin searching again. To see this, consider a particular interpretation of λ above, generated by the assumption that in any period where the agent has been previously successful but unrecognized, there is a probability z(r) that recognition occurs. (Once it is recognized, it remains recognized.)
There are two issues that arise with delayed recognition. First, as above, the agent may be concerned that she does not get paid. Second, a firm may hire an agent to work on a project that is later recognized to have been already solved. To address this second influence, assume that the return to success always goes to the earliest innovation, where any later innovator who explored the same partition gets nothing. (In reality, returns are lower if someone else was shown to have got there first.)
The implication of this is that we now need to distinguish between exploring a terrain that no one has attempted to map, and one where previous attempts have been made. First, for previously unexplored terrain, when choosing effort the expected return to the agent is as above, while the firm's expected return is
and so, with the notation above, λ =
. (Note that the firm need not worry about a later agent tackling the same problem as the earliest firm gets the returns.)
The case where someone tried before is more complicated. Here the fear is that it might retrospectively be recognized to be a success. This can give rise to more complicated dynamics as the efficient benchmark is no longer to always take the largest remaining partition.
The purpose here is not to describe that more complicated equilibrium but instead to show how this can allow the possibility of a field going temporarily fallow.
To see this, consider a simple setting where only projects up to size 1 4 are ever attempted.
The agent will do so if no one has previously attempted the project.
43 However, if a previous agent has already attempted it with no sign of success, it could be because the previous agent failed, or because she succeeded and it has not yet been recognized. Let it be τ periods since 43 This outcome is defined by λπ(e * ( is the equilibrium choice of effort for a partition size.
the previous agent tried. Then the probability that she succeeded (without being recognized)
is given by
Note that p (τ ) < 0: the more time that has elapsed, the less likely was success. Furthermore,
Any firm attempting to map that point is only rewarded if the previous agent was not successful, and so the current agent's expected pay is decreasing in p(τ ). As a result, an agent may be unwilling to explore directly after another agent has tried a project, as p (1) is high.
44 Let τ * be the smallest time period such that
Then the model has the feature that after every (failed) attempt at the project, that partition lies fallow for τ * periods before someone tries it again. Note also that p(τ ; r) is increasing in r, so that this possibility of a field going fallow is more severe for the most creative activities.
As such, the result suggests that local innovation does not go fallow, but projects which are most creatively ambitious are those which are temporarily dead.
The Relationship between Inputs and Success In the model above, inputs only play the role of providing signals on effort. Realistically, inputs cause outputs. Here we discuss the relationship between the inputs and success. Assume that there are n inputs, γ i , i = 1, 2, ..n.
These are random variables and are independently distributed γ i ∼ N (γ, σ 2 γ ). Exerting effort makes the choices more precise: specifically we assume that e = (σ
In keeping with the idea that creative success is rare, the mapping between inputs and success is that the agent must perform sufficiently well at each of the n inputs to achieve success. Success is achieved if γ i is within z of its correct value for all i. For any single
Normally distributed γ i , the probability that the identified choice lies within [−z, z] of the true value is the error function, whose pdf is given by Π(e) =
As the signals are conditionally independent, the probability of success is π(e) = Π(e) n . The optimal choice of effort for a project of size r is then given by the solution to max e E[
Assuming that the second order condition holds, the optimal choice of effort is given by
44 This will arise if U > (1 − p(1))λπ(e * (1))S(
This has the same features as the reduced form π function above, where the largest residual partition is tackled first, and effort is increasing in the size of the partition.
The only remaining issue is to map the information structure into a signal I. Assume that I = 1 if ζ > 0 where ζ = e + I , where I ∼ U [−qr, qr], where q is large enough that the agent believes that the solution is interior, so Γ < 1.
Noisy Inferences Above we simply assumed that g r < 0. There are a number of natural (and well known) agency settings where the spirit of this outcome arises:
• In the traditional career concerns model of Holmstrom, 1999 , agents are rewarded on beliefs of their perceived ability. This perception is based on a Bayesian estimate that depends on measures of performance. As an example, assume that performance on the inputs is y = f (e) + a + ζ(r), where a is the ability of the agent, f > 0, f < 0, and
Hence inferences are noisier for more creative projects. Assume that ability is symmetrically unknown: a ∼ N (a, σ 2 a ). In the model above, the agent was rewarded on the outcome of the two binary signals in a complementary way. Assume in the spirit of the setting above that the agent is now compensated according to the product of success and expected ability: w(Λ, y) = β 0 + βΛE(a|y), with β > 0. Then the statistic on which the agent is rewarded in equilibrium is Γ(e, r) = E(a|y) = a + Then if more creative actions involve more noisy evaluation, incentives fall.
Myopia We have assumed that agents live for only one period. This simplifies because it implies that the agent chooses the partition that is myopically efficient each period, taking account of her incentives. Myopia is necessary for the characterization of the dynamics above. It is, however, not necessary for creativity being limited for agency reasons, and indeed in some cases forward looking agents can exhibit even less creativity than their myopic counterparts. We show such an example in the Appendix.
Midpoints The outcome that allows us to characterize dynamics above is that agents choose the midpoint of their partitions. We showed above that the surplus of a discovery is maximized at the midpoint, but simply assumed that the agent's performance on the inputs only depends on r rather than its location in that space. One could imagine, however, situations where an agent's performance on the inputs might be most informative if located very close to one of the end points of the partition.
To see an alternative, consider a case where the agent need not do so. Then the first agent is faced with a single partition [0, 1] and chooses not to locate at 
Conclusion
Much is said about creativity, but often with little formal structure that reflects the need to discover something new. The purpose of the paper has been both to interpret the evidence on creativity through the lens of agency theory, and more positively, to offer the idea that limiting creative ambition, and working through cycles of this, may be an important tool in considering alleviating these agency concerns. Appendix Derivation of S(r): For location j, let it be in a partition [r 1 , r 2 ] where r 1 and r 2 are the nearest known neighbors, and let r = r 2 − r 1 . Because success is either fully revealed, or not revealed at all, any information attained on h j has value only to the point of known neighbors: beyond that it has no information value. Consider any interval [0, r], and note that for any point i, there are two signals on it, h 0 and h r , where
. Computing this over the range 0 to r gives the firm's utility over that partition as
Aggregate knowledge entering period t is (28) added over all partitions. Note that (28) is convex in r, so that the optimal choice involves splitting any partition in two equal parts.
Doing so implies a value of success for a project of ambition r given by
This is summing the residual variance in both the interval (r 1 , r 1 + , r 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 2: Let κ be defined as min (κ−k) such that S( As effort must be lowest for that partition this also implies that expected compensation is lowest.
Notice that the agent's reservation utility is ignored here. This is because the agent has a choice of projects 1 2 k and smaller. If a smaller option is available, this implies that a previous agent succeeded at 1 2 k before, so U (k) ≥ U . But if all projects up to κ are preferred to k, then these also offer utility higher than the reservation utility, and so we can ignore it.
At the end of the 2 k intervals initiated by the solution to a partition of size 1 2 k , all partitions up to size 1 2 κ−1 have been completed, and the agent considers whether to attempt a project of size 1 2 κ . If the utility from that is below U , the game ends. Otherwise, she attempts it and if she succeed, the same game as above occurs except where κ substitutes for k above.
Compensation and Creativity:
The following example involves the most creative being worst paid:
• Consider the discrete case above, where the agent exerts effort e = 1 only on projects of size ρ 1 to ρ 2 . This requires 1 < ρ 3 but r * ∈ [ρ 1 , ρ 2 ]. Then if 1 2 k ≤ ρ 2 , the last project attempted in equilibrium has effort exerted.
• Then if U * (
) < U * ( 1 2 k ), the lowest utility is attained by the agents who take the most creative actions, namely from . If the wage when µ 0 is paid out is less than b max , then this concludes the optimal contract.
If, however, it exceeds b max , then the only way to offer more incentives is to pay in the other partially successful state, where the firm now has residual bonus money of µ 1 = π(e)S(r) − w − Γb max or µ 1 = π(e)S(r) − w − πb max depending on which signal is the second most valuable. It then spreads that residual µ 1 in the least informative state where the outcome is 1, and will continue to do so until that bonus reaches b max . That occurs if π(e * )S(r) > w + (Γ + (1 − Γ)π)b max . In that case, the firm optimally pays a bonus if either signal is positive, as required.
As b max falls below that level, the firm continues to pay b max as a bonus if there if either Λ = 1 or I = 0, but increases w 0 above w for budget balance.
Myopia Consider the following extension. Assume now that agents live for two periods instead of one, but are not overlapping. She discounts at a rate δ.The agent captures expected her surplus over the two periods, so that if she chooses a project of size 1 2 k 1 in her first period, and 1 2 k 2 in her second, her utility is U (k 1 ) + δU (k 2 ). (Note that the set of available projects in period 2 could depend on whether she succeeds in period 1.) The strategic addition to the model above is that the agent may take a myopically dominated project in period 1, because if she is successful, it opens up an even more desirable project in period 2.
This can result in the agent becoming more or less creative than under myopia. To show the possibility of the latter, we provide an example. Consider the case that an agent is born when only two projects have been solved, one of size . This project could be sufficiently desirable to make it worthwhile.
This opportunity is not possible if she takes 
